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GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OF RESEARCH
IN POSITIVE EUGENICS
Although the dynamics of public policy formulation rarely permit consideration of other than immediate issues, policymakers must be willing to
deal with inchoate matters when confronted with foreseeable consequences
of considerable magnitude that can be averted only by prior development
of control mechanisms. Eugenics has begun to attract public attention by
demonstrating the feasibility of radical societal alteration through genetic
manipulation. Evaluation of eugenic programs and of methods to avert
their undesirable consequences should be based on a full awareness of the
ramifications of the available policy choices.
This article examines the potential societal problems that would accompany the implementation of eugenics programs and considers possible
mechanisms for dealing with these problems. Governmental control of
research in positive eugenics is identified as a practical means of preempting the undesirable consequences of scientific advances. Since proposed government research controls would infringe upon academic freedom of inquiry, the constitutional issues raised by this clash are framed
and analyzed.
I. THE NATURE OF EUGENICS

The purpose of eugenics is the self-direction of human evolution, the method of which is to bring in play those forces which
will cause the hereditary endowment of each future generation
to be an improvement over the generation which preceded it;
in short, to see to it that there is biological race progress instead
of race deterioration.1
From a genteel nineteenth century pseudoscience concerned with preferential human breeding,2 eugenics 3 has grown to be a viable area of
study with a potential impact less reminiscent of Julian Huxley's 4 academic concerns than of his brother's anti-Utopian fantasies. 5 The growing
number of significant discoveries has shifted the focus of eugenics from a
racially based interest in preventing undesirable procreation 6 to attempts
1 H. LAUGHLIN, THE LEGAL STATUS OF EUGENICAL STERILIZATION 60 (1930).
2 See generally K. LUDMERER, GENETICS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (1972).
3 The term was coined in 1883 by Sir Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin,
from the Greek eu- ± -genjs, meaning wellborn. Vukowich, The Dawning of the

Brave New World-Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues of Eugenics, 1971 U. ILL. L.F.
189.
4 See, e.g., J. HUXLEY, ESSAYS IN POPULAR SCIENCE (1927).
5 See, e.g., A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1st ed. 1932).
6 Elimination of undesirable genetic traits is termed negative eugenics.
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to introduce and perpetuate desirable genetic traits through artificial
7
means.
Support for the eugenics movement was at its peak8 in the early nineteenth century when organizations like the International Eugenics Congress 9 sought ,to increase awareness of the population problem and suggested remedies to forestall racial degeneration. Until its demise in the
1930's, the movement exerted substantial influence in state legislatures
and in Congress. The movement's supporters strongly believed in the continuing importance of premarital syphilis tests, aimed at avoiding the
procreation of defective children, 10 and incest prohibitions, a traditional
means of preventing debilitating inbreeding. 1" In addition, the movement
helped to secure passage of various new statutory provisions, including
antimiscegenation laws, 1 2- designed to preserve racial purity, and sterilization statutes, passed to prevent mental defectives and criminals from
further burdening society. 13 More stringent legislative controls were urged

7 Introduction and perpetuation of desirable genetic traits is termed positive
eugenics.
8 See, e.g., C. ARMSTRONG, THE SURVIVAL OF THE UNFITTEST 9, 31 (1927). Eminent
academicians joined to back many eugenic causes. See also H. JENNINGS, THE BIoLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN NATURE 226, 228 (1930) (calling for the scientific manipu-

lation of evolution); H.

LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES

(1922) (crusading for eugenic sterilization statutes); and K. LUDMERER, supra note 2,
at 7-43 (reporting on Charles Davenport, a contemporary eugenicist who viewed
eugenics as a viable science).
9 See 2 EUGENICS EDUCATION SOCIETY, PROBLEMS IN EUGENICS (1913).
10 See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 13a (McKinney 1964).
11 See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 5 (McKinney 1964).
12 These statutes usually prohibited marriage between Caucasians and Negroes.
They were found unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See, e.g.,
ch. 123, [1882] W. Va. Acts (repealed 1969).
13 The prevailing attitude toward eugenic sterilization during the first decades of
this century is best epitomized by Justice Holmes' statement in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200 (1927):
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon
the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call
upon those who already sap the strength of the state for these lesser
sacrifices . . . in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world if, instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility,
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad
enough to cover cutting the fallopian tubes. . . . Three generations of
imbeciles are enough.
Id. at 207.
The following state statutes still provide for compulsory sterilization: CAL. WELF.
& INST'NS CODE § 7274 (West 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-19 (1965); IDAHO
CODE § 39-3901 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 145.9 (1959); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 34, § 2462 (1964); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 720.301 (1963); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 174:1 (1955); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-36 (1967); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43A, § 341 (1933); ORE. REV. STAT. § 436.010 et seq. (1971); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 32-671 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 27-11-3 (1967); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 64-10-1 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-156 (1972); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.92.100 (1959); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-1 (Supp. 1970); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 46.12 (1955).
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by others who proposed model eugenics legislation calling for sterilization
of blind persons, deaf persons, orphans, and inebriates. 14 Institutional
segregation of social inadequates was also proposed. 15
These early efforts were all forms of negative eugenics, the goal of
which is to eliminate undesirable genetic traits from society. 6 In the
United States, these measures never received the support which was given
them in Nazi Germany, where many believed that racial deficiencies
were being eliminated. In recent years, however, there has been a renewed interest in eugenics, although the focus has shifted from social and
racial faults to genetic flaws because of increasing concern about the
status of the genetic load, the total number of defective genes in the gene
pool of the population. Voluntary procedures such as amniocentesis 7 and
therapeutic impregnation' are now emphasized and have become more
significant than statutory means in effecting eugenic goals. But the success of negative eugenic programs depends upon a formal consensus,
close monitoring, and careful supervision. Without universal application
of uniform standards for identifying genetic defects, errors are inevitable
and will necessarily impede the development of a "purer" race.
It is now possible to ensure longer lives for many genetically defective
human beings. Therefore, a large number of people who previously would
not have survived childhood are now procreating and passing on an increased number of deleterious genes.' At the same time, overpopulation has led to shortages of resources and facilities. 20 Many feel that, in
order to stop the increasing drain on resources, drastic means are necessary to ensure maximum normalcy so that resources are efficiently allocated. The declining birth rate in recent years"1 has also fostered greater
interest in assuring the normalcy of offspring.'2 Procedures such as
amniocentesis may allow prenatal identification of abnormalities, but recH. LAUGHLIN,

EUGENIC STERILIZATION: 1926, at 65 (1926).
H. LAUGHLIN, supra note 8, at 339-56.
16 See generally G. TAYLOR, THE BIOLOGICAL TIME BOMB (1968).
17 Amniocentesis is the testing of umbilical fluid for the presence of prenatally detectable defects. The process has resulted in a decline in the number of mongoloid
births and could significantly reduce their incidence ifused on a wider scale. Friedmann, PrenatalDiagnosis of Genetic Disease, 225 SCIENTIFIC AM., Nov., 1971, at 34,
38. For an extensive discussion of the procedure and its legal ramifications see
Friedman, The Common Law Implications of Aminocentesis: The New "Cure" for
GIP [Genetically Imperfect Progeny] Syndromes (publication forthcoming).
1s Therapeutic impregnation or artificial insemination (The former term is preferred because of the adverse psychological inferences of "artificial". See Note, 39
U. CIN. L. REV. 291, 292 (1970)), may. be employed as a negative eugenic means
through careful selection of donor sperm and voluntary use of the process when a
male has a high probability of transmitting a defect.
19 See, e.g., Glass, Human Heredity and Ethical Problems, in J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 453 (1972).
14

15

20 U.S. COMM'N ON

POPULATION AND

THE

AMERICAN

FUTURE,

REPORT OF

THE

COMM'N ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE 12, 42 (1972).
21 Id. at 19; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED

1973, at 11 (1973).
This would appear to be a logical conclusion drawn from an increase in the
use of genetic counseling and amniocentesis. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 17.
STATES:

22
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ognition of a right to bear normal children or a right to be born normal 23
would require the use of positive eugenic procedures such as cloning or
genetic engineering.
Positive eugenics, which seeks to introduce desirable traits into the
gene pool, may provide maximum genetic normalcy. But the procedures
of positive eugenics pose a much greater threat than those of negative
eugenics since the effects of the former are more far-reaching and susceptible to egregious misuse by unethical experimenters. Cloning is widely
viewed as the vehicle for an effctive program of positive eugenics.2 4
The process involves replacing the haploid nucleus of an unfertilized
mature egg cell with an adult dipoid nucleus from a specialized cell. 2 5
The cloned human being is genetically identical to his progenitor and,
given similar environmental conditions, can be reproduced innumerable
times.
Ten years ago, Dr. Seward of Cornell performed a successful cloning
using a coconut milk mixture to clone a carrot cell.26 Not long thereafter, Professor John Gurdon, a biologist at Oxford, used an intestinal cell
of a frog to clone an identical offspring.2 7 While complex problems must
be solved before successful mammalian experiments become a reality,
many scientists assume the feasibility of cloning human beings 28 and
estimate that a successful cloning of a human may occur within five to
twenty-five years.-'

23 The growing concern with the right to bear normal children is also reflected in
the "wrongful life" cases. Public policy considerations against recognition of a
preference for death over life historically prevented recovery in such cases. See
Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill.
App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1966); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp.,
58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968), afl'd inl part, rev'd in part, 35 App.
Div. 2d 531, 313N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970); Williams v. State, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl.
1965), rev'd, 25 App. Div. 2d 907, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786, af0'd, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223
N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S2d 885 (1966). But in Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240,
187 N.W.2d 511 (1971), parents recovered damages against a pharmacist for the
birth of an unwanted child because of the pharmacist's negligent dispensation of a
tranquilizer in lieu of birth control pills. See Friedman, supra note 17.
24 Freund, Xeroxing Human Beings, in Can Matt Control His Biological Evolution?, A Symposiun on Genetic Engineering, 28 BULL. ATOMIC Sci. Dec., 1972, at
18 [hereinafter cited as Genetic Engineering Synposium].
25 Skin or intestinal cells are commonly used. Kass, The New Biology: What Price
Relieving Matt's Estate?, 174 Sci. 779, 780-81 (1971). The cloning of different flower
hybrids is a familiar use of the procedure, although far more simplified than animal
replication.
2
6 G. TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 24.
27 Beckwith, Science for the People, 196 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIENCES 236, 237
(1972); Gaylin, We Have the Awful Knowledge to Make Exact Copies of Human
Beings,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 43.
2
8 G. TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 26-30.
29 See, e.g., Gaylin, supra note 27, at 43 (human cloning in ten to twenty years);
Tunney & Levine, Genetic Engineering, 1 SAT. REV. Sci. 23, 24 (1972) (mammals
within five years and humans within ten to twenty-five years). Such confidence is not
universally shared among geneticists, as evidenced by attitudes at the 13th International
Congress of Genetics:
[T]here was no clear indication in the scores of scientific sessions that
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Parthenogenesis, conception without fertilization, 30 is a process somewhat similar to cloning, but may be less desirable because it passes on
only one set of chromosomes. 31 In this process, a mature egg cell is
mechanically or chemically stimulated to produce cell division, thus obviating the need for fertilization. 32 Unlike cloning, which produces a
genetically balanced copy of the donor, parthenogenesis does not yield
progeny identical to the donor and may perpetuate previously unexpressed side traits. Although successfully performed in 1939 on a rabbit, 33 the process has not yet been applied to higher animal forms.
In vitro, or "test tube," fertilization, a procedure expected to be
perfected soon, 34 may be used to select the sex of children, through inspection of eggs in a test tube. 35 With further advances in chromosome analysis, desirable genetic traits may also be recognizable in parental chromosomes. As a supplement to cloning or in vitro fertilization, chromosome
analysis may enable alteration or replacement of deleterious genes
through genetic engineering.3Q Similarly, therapeutic impregnation can
allow informed choice of superior sperm. 37 Both in vitro fertilization and
therapeutic impregnation, however, contain an element of chance that
cloning, through exact replication, eliminates.
11.

OBJECTIONS TO POSITIVE EUGENICS

The possibility of cloning hundreds or thousands of reproductions of
the same individual portends a number of social, ethical, and medical
consequences that advocates of full-scale research often ignore. Some
prospective consequences are considered in this section; methods for
avoiding detrimental consequences are treated in the subsequent section.

A. Abridgment of Individual Rights
Individual rights subject to abridgment by positive eugenic measures
may be asserted by both parents and cloned offspring. 38 As one author
genetic engineering was very much closer to reality than five years ago.
In fact, there was some feeling that earlier predictions of imminent
genetic programming were a bit premature.
Rheinhold, Challenge of Genetics Fades for Scientists, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1973,
at 34, col. 1.
30 G. TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 30.
31

Id.

32 Gaylin, supra note 27, at 41.
33 Id.
34 G. TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 34.

35 Gaylin, supra note 27, at 48.
36 Vukowich, supra note 3, at 190; N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1973, at 34, col. 1.
37 Neel, Social and Scientific Priorities in the Use of Genetic Knowledge, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS: GENETIC COUNSELING AND THE USE OF GENETIC
KNOWLEDGE 353 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HUMAN GENETICS SYMPOSIUM].

38 See, e.g., notes 64 and 76 infra. For a consideration of some issues that might
be raised see Liston, Cloning: Can Human Rights Be Duplicated? (unpublished seminar paper on file with Professor Marcus Plant of the University of Michigan Law
School).
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states: "A state's desire to improve life for man of the future may not be
a sufficiently compelling interest to constitutionally deprive man today of
39
some of his fundamental civil liberties.
Cloning involves perpetuation of desirable traits, but it may also be
used as a justification for limiting transmission of undesirable traits. Thus,
eugenic cloning could be inherently discriminatory if it places limits on
41
the right of procreation. A fundamental right 40 or suspect classification
is involved, and, therefore, a compelling state interest is necessary to sustain legislated discriminatory effects. In order to show a compelling state
interest, a state would have to prove, at a minimum, presence of an irreversible and avertable disaster. Under existing norms and case law, 42 this
proof burden would be virtually impossible to satisfy. The free exercise
of the right to marry 43 and the penumbral right of marital privacy, 44 as
well as the right to procreate, would be infringed by genetic cloning.
The undefined status of cloned offspring may inhibit the assertion of
legally recognized rights. 45 If the offspring are deemed to be persons

within the meaning of the Constitution, they may, nonetheless, encounter
difficulty in being assigned full rights. 46 In addition, it must be deter-

mined whether a "genetically engineered" individual would have a right
47
to withhold his consent to further cloning.
A cloned individual may have a cause of action for recovery of compensatory damages. Actions for wrongful life have multiplied in recent
years, 48 and, while no infant has yet won a judgment, there is evidence
of judicial retreat from the absolutism that accompanied earlier decisions. 49 Certainly the plea of a socially ostracized child, who would have
preferred to have all the traits of his parents rather than the selection
transmitted through genetic engineering, presents a claim as compelling
as that of the bastard who brings an action based upon the stigma of his
social classification. 0 Finally, the situation of a cloned individual saddled
39 Vukowich, supra note 3, at 226. See also Grad, Legislative Responses to the
New Biology: Limits and Possibilities, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 480 (1968), where the
author states, "There is little doubt . . . that compulsory eugenic controls of a
'positive' nature would violate the due process clause . . . as well as the ninth amend-

ment." Id. at 486.
40 See notes 95-107 and accompanying text infra.
41 Id.
42 See note 98 and accompany text infra.
43 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
44 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
45 Liston, supra note 38. For example, inheritance rights might be difficult to determine when each parent has permitted several hundred children to be cloned from
his or her cells.
46 See Liston, supra note 38.
47 See Ramsey, Genetic Engineering, in Genetic Engineering Symposium, supra
note 24, at 15.
48 See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
49
See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Williams
y. State, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965), rev'd, 25 App. Div. 2d 907, 269 N.Y.S.2d
786, afl'd, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S. 2d 885 (1966).
50 Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 I1. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 945 (1964); Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d
885 (1966).
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of a
with an erroneously transmitted negative trait can be likened to that
51
aborted.
not
was
he
deformed child who sues for damages because
B. Protection of Society's Rights
Protection of the interests of society as a whole must be considered.
Any errors in cloning will be irreversible. The government might be confronted with the problem of arbitrarily classifying the progeny as unsuccessful clones, which are to be killed, or as humanoids, who will be permitted to live at government expense as a reminder of the imperfect
operation of cloning techniques. 52
Incomplete knowledge can impose even greater burdens against which
society may wish to legislate. While acquisition of greater knowledge is
an integral part of scientific progress, fundamental errors in early cloning
techniques might take decades to discover and, during the time it would
53
take to rid society of genetic disease, any genetic progress of previous
work would be effectively defeated and the cloned individuals would be
ruined. In an earlier day, eugenic sterilization laws were enacted on the
basis of incomplete scientific knowledge. The Supreme Court responded
by holding a state recidivist sterilization statute unconstitutional in Skinner
v. Oklahoma.54 Chief Justice Stone, in a concurring opinion, pointed out
that the lack of consensus among members of the scientific community
concerning the question of whether criminal tendencies are inherited rendered such a compulsory sterilization law inappropriate and violative of
equal protection.

55

51 Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1966); Stewart v. Long Island
College Hosp., 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970).
52

See, e.g., P.

RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN

78 (1971); Gaylin, supra note 27, at 48.

Callahan, The Meaning and Signifiance of Genetic Disease: Philosophical Perspectives, in HUMAN GENETICS SYMPOSIUM, supra note 37, at 85.
54 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
53

55 Id. at 545. An analogous dilemma was presented by the implementation of statutes requiring blood tests of all new born infants in order to detect the presence of
phenylketonuria (PKU). PKU is a disease that hinders the development and growth
of the central nervous system, ultimately causing an early death. The Guthrie test, a
urine analysis, had to be abandoned because too many false positives occurred. Misdiagnosis meant that normal babies were put on low phenylalanine diets to correct
the supposed defect and consequently suffered subnormal weight gain and reduced
linear growth. Blood tests were then substituted for the Guthrie test and, by 1971,
forty-one states had mandatory testing provisions. However, because the procedure
is still not perfected and the consequences of error are severe-as would be the case
with cloning-some states have considered relaxing the requirements, and no new

mandatory testing statutes have recently appeared. Swazer, Phenylketonuria: A Case
Study in Biomedical Legislation, 48 J. URBAN L. 883, 883-99 (1971).

Among the state statutes currently requiring the PKU test are: ALA. Code tit. 22, §
58(1) (Cum. Supp. 1971); ALASKA STAT. § 18.15.200 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82625 (Cum. Supp. 1971); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 280 (West Supp. 1973); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-21(b) (1965); FLA. STAT. § 383.14 (Supp. 1973); GA. CODE
ANN. § 88-1201.1 (1966); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 333-1 (1965); IDAHO CODE § 39-909
(Supp. 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 113(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 35.31 (1967); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-180 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 43, § 38A (1951); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § l1OA (1963); MICH. COMp.
LAWS ANN. § 325.521 (1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.065 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1973);

Journal of Law Reform

[ VOL. 7:615

Related to the problem of incomplete knowledge is the danger that
traits deemed desirable for transmission by one generation may be useless
or dtrimental to a succeeding one. 56 As with eugenic proposals for carefully restricted sperm screening, it is possible that inbreeding will decrease
genetic variability and, consequently, the ability to adapt to new environments.57 For example, while intelligence is generally considered a desirable quality to pass on ,to one's offspring, increases in intelligence alone
may not supply the requisite genetic elements for survival in a subsequent
generation. 58 Preventing the propogation of only one racial strain is yet
another facet of society's interest in ensuring strong and well-balanced
future generations. 59
Finally, the advocates of full-scale research in positive eugenics must
confront the general population's interests in averting the consequences
of changing values in cloning decisions. 60 The problem of defining nor-

NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-604.01 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2-84 (Supp. 1973);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-a (McKinney 1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-17-04
(1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.501 (Page 1966); OKLA. STAf. ANN. tit. 63, §
1-534 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-13-12 (1964); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-624
(1973); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447e (1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-17-21
(1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 32-112.1 (1966); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-22-3 (1966);
WIS. STAT. § 146.02 (1971).
56 Dr. Kurt Hirschorn of Mt. Sinai Medical Center, quoted in N.Y. Times, May

2, 1969, at 40, col. 4.
57 Id.
58 Vukowich, supra note 3, at 202.
59 As one observer notes: "A whole town of Marilyn Monroes and Einsteins would
be pretty dull." Dr. Gunther Stent of U.S.C., quoted in Rheinhold, Challenge of
Genetics Fades for Scientists, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1973, at 34, col. 1. Furthermore,
creativity, as an isolated and defined entity, would lose its essence if most people
thought in similar intellectual patterns. A plethora of geniuses might exert an
excessively conservative influence on society and retard progress in all but a few
narrowly confined areas. See, e.g., Davis, Prospects for Genetic Intervention in Man,

170 Sci. 1279, 1282 (1970).
Another serious factor that must be considered is that a desirable genotype chosen
for replication might carry with it undesirable side traits. But even if it becomes
possible to completely isolate traits, there still remains the even greater danger of
cloned persons rebelling and procreating among themselves. For an interesting application of this idea see Batt, They Shoot Horses, Don't They?: An Essay on the
Scotoma of One-Eyed Kings, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 510 (1968).

60 See Liston, supra note 38. The problem of changing values and vacillatory political idealogies is well illustrated by the writing of H.J. Muller, who, in 1935, said
that society should strive toward the attainment of the qualities of men like Lenin
and Darwin. In a later book, which was published in a different political climate,
Muller changed his models to Einstein, Pasteur, Descartes, and Lincoln. Ramsey,

Moral and Religious Implications of Genetic Control, in GENETICS AND THE FUTURE

158 (J. Rolansky ed. 1966).
The controversy surrounding Dr. Arthur Jensen's theory that the lower intelligence
quotients of black students as compared to white students were genetically caused
provides another illustration of the scientific and social difficulties in promoting both
social values and scientific freedom. Jensen's claim that 80 percent of intelligence is
related to inheritance caused a furor in academic circles and precipitated immediate
charges of overbroad conclusions and inadequate procedures. Edson, The Theory
OF MAN

that IQ is Largely Determined by the Genes, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1969, § 6 (Maga-

zine), at 10, 46.
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mative terms like "disease," "abnormal," and "normal""' will be removed
from an academic setting and thrust into a context in which human lives
will depend on each definition.
When preferences in cloning experiments are subjected to legislative or
administrative influence, perhaps through the immense power wielded by
those who fund research programs, serious ethical and social consequences
follow.
For what purposes should we alter our genes? To whom should
we give this power? To those who have already perverted physics into atomic weapons, chemistry into poison gas, or electronics into guided missiles? If we make men gods, are they to be
62
gods of war?
Concern over abuse by government officials may be unnecessary, however, as human cloning may be impossible to restrict through legislative
fiat once the procedure is perfected.6 3 Thus, leadership may be thrust
upon the scientists who control the cloning process-a group commonly
64
thought to be excessively myopic.
Uniformity of trait selection standards is a necessity, however, if the
object of positive eugenics, the creation of a genetically improved race,
is to succeed. Because variant aberrations would defeat this purpose, a
strict program of mandatory governmental control would be required, a
prospect which few would embrace with great enthusiasm. The choice to
be made, then, may ultimately be between cloning and its attendant government supervision or control of research that would render the procedure feasible.
III.

CONTROL OF RESEARCH

[W e ...carefully limit the scope of ...[science's] researches.
...We don't allow it to deal with any but the most immediate
61

Tunney & Levine, supra note 29, at 26.

62 Sorenson, Sociological and Psychological Factors in Applied Human Genetics,
in HUMAN GENETICS SYMPOSIUM, supra note 37, at 298.
63 Green, Mechanisms for Public Policy Decision-Making, in HUMAN GENETICS
SYMPOSIUM, supra note

37.

Unfortunately, if we wait until the basic research has progressed to
the point at which there is a capability of cloning human beings for
beneficial purposes, we shall have lost valuable time for public discussion and debate. . . . [lIn any event the problem of formulating a
public policy to deal with cloning will have become, by that time, much
more difficult because of vested interests.
Id. at 393. See also Djeras, Probabilities and Practicalities, in Genetic Engineering
Symposium, supra note 24, at 25.
64 Hearings on S.I. Res. 145 Before the Subcomnm. on Gov't Research of the Senate Coin. on Gov't Operations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on S.J. Res. 1451. Dr. Arthur Kornberg testified that he saw no immediate
legal or ethical problems in genetic research, and that if scientists were to become
public figures, their research efforts would become ineffectual. Id. at 50-51. See also
Potter, Bioethics for Whom?, 196 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIENCES 200 (1972). Potter
states: "My objection is to the professional attitude that exalts so-called pure research
as an end in itself . . . and at the same time accepts no responsibility for the con-

sequences." Id.
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problems of the moment. All other enquiries are most sedulously discouraged.... Anything for a quiet life. We've gone
on controlling ever since [the Nine Years' War]. It hasn't been
very good for truth of course. But it's been very good for happiness. One can't have something for nothing. Happiness has
got to be paid for.65
If policymakers determine that the benefits of positive eugenics are
outweighed by the potential negative consequences, they may wish to evaluate several alternative mechanisms for regulating eugenic research. As
restraints on research tighten, progress suffers, so it is important that the
available options be considered.
A. Available Alternatives
1. Self-Regulation by Scientists-Scientists who advocate self-regulation
claim to recognize the possibilities of eugenic abuse, but feel that governmentally imposed research controls are not the answer. 66 As Dr.
Joshua Lederberg notes: "Many scientists, already battered by neoromantic criticism, will equate any movement toward the control of science with the Vatican's inquisition of Galiieo." 67 They feel that the
inevitability of progress68 must be met with an effort "to see that some'69
thing is done well, not -to prevent its being done a all."
Proponents of self-discipline point out that research in disease prevention might be hindered if genetic research were curtailed; efforts to repair,
or to restrict the transmission of, defective genes could be thwarted.70
Cancer research also involves the same fundamental area of research as
genetics.71
The enthusiasm expressed by some regarding the desirability of genetic
research and the needlessness of external controls 7 2 has given way to
serious reconsideration of the matter by members of the scientific community.7 3 In 1973, at the Thirteenth International Congress of Genetics,
6

5 A. HUXLEY, supra note 5, at 155.
66 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 59, at 1282; Academic and Professional Freedom, 4
BRIT. MED. J. 379 (1969).
67 Lederberg, The Freedoms and the Control of Science: Notes from the Ivory
Tower, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 596 (1972).
68 See, e.g., Lubs, Privacy and Genetic Information, in HUMAN GENETICS SYMPOSIUM, supra note 37, at 274; Hirshcorn, Practicaland Ethical Problems in Human
Genetics, 8 BIRTH DEFECTS: ORIGINAL ARTICLE SERIES 17, 29 (D. Bergsma ed. 1972).
09 Lubs, supra note 68, at 274.
70 Davis, supra note 59, at 1282.
71 Cancer research is one of the few areas not subject to federal budget cuts in
scientific research; it continues to receive top allocations. 103 Sci. NEWS 69 (1973);

Davis, supra note 59, at 1282.
72

See, e.g., Sorenson, supra note 62, at 298; Hearings on S.J. Res. 145, supra

note 64, at 46 (statement of Dr. Arthur Kornberg).
73 Gaylin, supra note 27, at 12. See also Hirschcorn, supra note 68, at 29-30; N.Y.
Times, Mar. 4, 1972, at 16, col. 5.
The significant efforts of the Fogarty International Center (see HUMAN GENETICS
SYMPOSIUM, supra note 37), and of the Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life
Sciences (Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y.) in exploring more fully the ramifications of
genetic research should be noted.
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many participants expressed fear of a "genetically controlled society," 74
and called for greater social controls to avoid the appearance of a "new
eugenics". 75 Close observers of proiress in scientific research have found
not be
that ,those involved in potentially dangerous genetic advances may
78
able to apprehend all the possible consequences of their work.
Two factors may thus vitiate the efficacy of scientific self-regulation in
eugenics. First, the disagreements apparent among the researchers will
probably preclude the fashioning of effective uniform restraints. Second,
because most positive eugenic techniques will be widely known, prevention of abuses may be impossible. Given the need to prevent such abuses
and their catastrophic results, another institutional element must be interjected into the regulatory process.
2. Advisory Bodies-The establishment of advisory bodies to monitor
the progress of eugenics research would provide another alternative which
would still allow scientists to maintain some measure of control over the
direction of their work. While no such advisory body presently exists in
this country, the need for better communication between the public and
the scientific community has been widely recognized. 77 In 196878 and
1971, 79 Senator Mondale introduced resolutions that would have established a commission for a two-year period to "provide for a study
and evaluation of the ethical, social, and legal implications of advances
in biomedical research and technology."' 0 Neither resolution was
passed. 8s Opposition, in many cases, was predicated upon the limited
82
utility of a short-tenured group.
While pioneering efforts like Mondale's represent an overdue recognition of the necessity for such evaluation, truly effective control of the
awesome capabilities of positive eugenics must come from permanent bodies. The communication channels established should permit a viable twoway exchange such that the public will be able to voice opposition to
74
75

Rheinhold, supra note 29, at 34.
Id.

76 Beckwith, supra note 27, at 236.
What has struck me and depressed me .

.

. is their lack of concern or

even more surprising their apparent lack of awareness for the potential

misuse of their work.
Id. See also Senator Walter Mondale, commenting upon testimony given in conjunction
with his bill to establish a National Advisory Commission on Health, Science and
Society (S.J. Res. 145, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968)):
I was disappointed and appalled by the almost unexplainable fear on

the part of some scientists about the public being involved. Their atti-

tude was, 'It's none of the public's business.' Others said, 'Do it, but
keep it within the profession.'
N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1971, at 54, col. 3.
77 See Green, supra note 63; Kass, Babies by Means of In Vitro Fertilization: Unethical Experiments on the Unborn?, 28 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 1174 (1971).

S.J. Res. 145, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
S.J. Res. 75, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
80 S. Rep. No. 92-517, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971).
81 Both bills died in House Committees.
78

79

82

S. Rep. 92-517, supra note 80, at 7. See also Hearings on S.i. Res. 145, supra

note 64, at 57-58 (testimony of Dr. Lederberg).
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scientific advances well before the precipitous point at which attainment
becomes a foregone conclusion.
Any advisory body requires extensive cooperation, and many scientists
are not yet willing to allow, or to concern themselves with, the public
acquisition of current scientific research information. An effective system
of data dissemination and informational feedback could be further retarded since no efficient bureaucratic administration exists upon which to
model an advisory board. Ideally, it is the advisory body that would provide the most flexible participation by scientists and the least offensive
means of control. With rapidly advancing progress in positive eugenics,
however, there may not be time for trial periods or evolutionary development.
3. Government Funding Policies-The manipulation of eugenic research through government funding policies provides another means for
regulation. In contrast to the effect of legislated prohibitions, under a system of government allocation of research funds the scientific community
could still influence administrative policy-making. The federal government
already has substantial influence on the research community; 95 percent
of federal research funds are allotted to colleges and universities., Since
1966, when the government supplied 59 percent of all medical research
funds,8 4 the share borne by industry and other sources has steadily decreased.8 5 This massive allocation has been accompanied by fears of both
outright coercion by government agencies and willing accommodation to
agency research preferences.8 6 Although funding agencies purport to encourage independent research, "consonant with [the] ... academic philosophies and institutional objectives" 87 of various colleges and universities,
blacklisting practices are notorious, 8 and threats of nonsupport often supplant legislative or quasi-judicial methods in determining funding standards.8
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare's statement of objectives for support of biomedical sciences provides further irony. The Department claims to want to "explore new and unorthodox ideas, and
to recognize and support creative talent in young investigators," 9 0 but
Dr. J. D. Watson, commenting on funding practices in cancer research,
has observed quite the opposite:
83

See

NATIONAL

LEGES AND

TOTAL

SCIENCE FOUNDATION, FEDERAL SUPPORT TO UNIVERSITIES,

SELECTED

NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS,

FISCAL

YEAR

COL-

1971, at iv (1972).

NSF and HEW grants amount to over $22 billion annually. Id. at 3.

84 HEW,

RESOURCES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH

1947-1966, at iii (1967).

Id. These sources include state and local governments.
86 See Kalkstein, Funding and Decision-Makingin Science, 196 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.
SCIENCES 282 (1972); Kirk, Massive Subsidies and Academic Freedom, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 607, 608 (1963); Van Den Haag, Academic Freedom in the United
85

States, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 515, 519 (1963).
87 HEW, GRANTS ADMINISTRATION STAFF MANUAL X-2-65-1, 5 (1970).
88
89

Lederberg, supra note 67, at 600.

Berliner, Administration and Ethics, in

EARLY DIAGNOSIS OF HUMAN

DEFECTS: SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

90 HEW,

196 (M. Harris ed. 1971).

GRANTS-IN-AID AND OTHER FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

GENETIC

164 (1967).
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All too large a proportion of this [government] contract money
will go to senior established people as opposed to younger scientists who have yet to prove themselves. Yet almost every
important new discovery comes from someone under 35 and
who at the moment of his breakthrough is essentially unknown
to the outer world and unlikely to be given a contract by a Government that looks with disaster on the unpredictable. 91
Watson's comment highlights another concern about government
research-funding policy-the desire for the "fast pay off". 92 Agencies
claim that allocations are made on the basis of the proposal's merit alone,
constrained only by budgetary limitations. In reality, decisions are often
made either by looking for dollar-measurable returns on research investment, or on emotional and political grounds. 93 Recent events suggest that
sake has taken a rhetorical and
"l[t] he quest for knowledge for its own
'94
monetary backseat to practical science."
In regulating cloning research, the use of agency coercion in lieu of an
outright statutory prohibition leaves dangers of clandestine progress alive.
Furthermore, if one Administration sanctions research related to cloning,
a succeeding Administration with different policies may not assume power
until it is too late to abort the development of the procedure. Assuming
that these drawbacks will be present in any regulatory alternative short of
a ban on cloning research, government funding policy may be the most
feasible method available. But whether close governmental supervision of
research is preferable to proscription remains to be seen.
Scientific self-restraint, advisory bodies, and funding manipulation may
not provide adequate safeguards for the prevention of eugenic advances.
If a more final and assured control is desired, the most reliable alternative
for regulating eugenic research is direct government control. The constitutional constraints on research-control legislation are considered in the following section.
B. The Legislative Control Alternative
1. The Government's Interests-As an alternative to nonlegislated
methods of control, statutory proscriptions will be most effective in cur91 Watson, When Worlds Collide: Research and Know-Nothingism, N.Y. Times,

Mar. 22, 1973, at 43, col. 2.
92 Id. at 43.
93 Kaplan, Emotion Versus Objectivity in the Funding of Biomedical Research, 196
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIENCES 274 (1972).
94A Belt Tightening Time for American Science, 103 Sci. NEWS 68 (1973). The

direction of scientific effort has already been significantly altered in areas of pure
research. The President's, and consequently the agencies', current emphasis has been
on more private funding and concentration on industrial applications. While the
popular targets of cancer, heart disease, and sickle cell anemia have sustained no
loss in grant allocations, there have been large cutbacks in other areas, as well as
the impoundment of National Institute of Health funds. Perhaps most unfortunate
are the curtailing of Ph.D. grants and funds for groups like the Fogarty International
Center, which is currently engaged in studying ethical and social ramifications of
scientific advances. 103 Sci. NEws 69 (1973).
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tailing eugenics research. In order for the government to intrude into the
domain of biomedical research, it must establish an interest in protecting
society against the development of cloning. The government's interest
must be strong enough to override scientists' claims of unconstitutional
deprivations.
The two countervailing interests that will most likely be encountered
by the government are that researchers in eugenics will be denied equal
protection or that they will be deprived of a fundamental first amendment
right in violation of their due process rights. The former claim will be
premised upon the notion that scientists involved in cloning research have
been unfairly singled out as the object of underinclusive legislation,9 5
because effective prevention of potentially dangerous genetic developments would entail coverage of a far broader research spectrum. The latter claim will be based on the idea that scientific research activity is constitutionally protected under the rubric of freedom of thought.
The cloning researchers' claims are examined seriatim.
2. Equal Protection-If legislative control over research is judged to
97
involve invidious discrimination "6 or reliance upon suspect criteria,
the government will be required to support the legislation with a compelling public interest. 98 On the other hand, such strict scrutiny by a court
would not be necessary if only social or economic interests were at stake,
since a presumption of rationality would exist, and those attacking the
statute would then have to prove that there was no rational basis for the
legislation. 99
Dandridge v. Williams' ° provides an appropriate measure of the extent of social and economic welfare. In that case, the Supreme Court upheld, against claims of denial of equal protection, a Maryland statute
limiting federal aid to families with dependent children so as to penalize
recipients who produced additional offspring. In permitting the state to
use rough accommodations' 0" and to address itself to some aspects of the
fiscal problem without attacking all,' 02 the Court stated that, had there
been legislative discrimination infringing first amendment rights, the regulation might have overreached constitutional limitations. 1° 3
Eugenic researchers' assertion of fundamental educational 04 and first

95 Legislation deals with only part of the problem to be remedied. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
96 See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
97 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
98 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970).
99 See notes 95-96 and accompanying text supra. For a general discussion of these
equal protection concepts see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1065 (1969).
100 397 U.S. 471 (1970).

101 Id. at 485.
102 Id. at 486-87. In other words, the state is permitted the underinclusiveness
which is prohibited where fundamental rights are involved.
103

Id. at 484.

104

See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,supra note 99, at 1120.
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amendment' 0 5 interests would preclude the judicial deference to legislative rationality typically accorded purely social aspects of control. 10 6 Furthermore, if such fundamental interests are established, strict scrutiny is
applied to the legislative enactment despite the absence of invidious discrimination. 10
While it might be argued that cloning research presents only social and
economic questions, the researchers' assertion of their fundamental rights
would draw the issue into the arena of strict scrutiny and require a showing of a compelling public interest' 08 on the part of those who advocate
control, as well as proof of carefully tailored means of implementation.10 9
Thus, the primary issue to be resolved is whether cloning is sufficiently
imminent and so dangerous that the potential consequences provide the
state with a compelling interest sufficient to override objections based on
infringement of individuals' fundamental constitutional rights. In order to
assess the constitutional footing for a specific governmental proscription of
research, the extent of permissible health and safety regulations must be
examined.
The government's right to legislate in the public interest has been extended to health-related measures. Once perfected, cloning could pose
such serious risks that research regulation will be permitted under the
aegis of the protection of public health and welfare. While the concept of
the right to a normal child is gaining more popular acceptance, 110 society
may not be ready to accept the logical extension of this notion-armies
of perfect, selected progeny, subject to few familial constraints and lacking
the individualism inherent in children created by sexual reproduction.
Dangers to society may outweigh the importance of protecting research
freedoms. If traits for transmission by cloning are chosen in order to reduce genetic stability or necessary survival mechanisms, the health of the
entire population would be at stake. Accidents resulting from a constantly
changing cloning process could threaten general welfare and safety. The
inability to control the use of cloning by unscrupulous experimenters"'
or politicans reinforces the dangers. In addition, the harm to potential
105See

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970); Developments in the

Law-Equal Protection, supra note 99, at 1128.
106 397 U.S. at 486-87.
107 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969), where a one-year
residency requirement for welfare benefit eligibility was held to be a denial of equal
protection not offset by a sufficient compelling state interest. See also Developments
in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 99, at 1129-32. If a fundamental interest
is established, strict scrutiny of the legislative enactment applies, despite the absence
of invidious discrimination. Id. at 1132.
108 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 688 (1969).
100 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 99, at 1122.
110 See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
111 See, e.g., Gaylin, supra note 27, at 44.
In pure research ... a goal may be pursued with no advance knowledge
of its utility. . . . In these circumstances, the experimentalist is often
tempted to do what can be done-merely for the excitement of doing it.
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life resulting from misdirected applications might be serious enough to
require government action. Thus, the government may base its regulatory
scheme on protection of future generations from the dehumanizing effects
112
of cloning.
In Roe v. Wade, 113 the Supreme Court cautioned that the safeguarding
of health, medical standards, and potential life' 14 could stand as suffi11
ciently important interests to outweigh countervailing individual rights."
In rejecting a claim of deprivation of first amendment religious freedom,
the Court, in Prince v. Massachusetts,'16 supported the interest of the
state in protecting childrens' welfare under a statute prohibiting child
labor. In so doing, the Court observed: "The right to practice religion
freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to
communicable diseases or the latter to ill health or death."' 17 With reference to cloning research, the importance of the academic freedoms being asserted" 8 must be balanced against the potential detrimental effects
on society.
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 19 the Supreme Court held that compulsory vaccination laws were reasonable regulations established to protect
public health and safety, and therefore not in derogation of due process
rights. 120 If legislative prohibition of cloning research is the only feasible
means available to prevent cloning, such a prohibition should be constitutionally permissible. Jacobson was later extended to justify the use of
eugenic sterilization in Buck v. Bell, 21 and thus may be seen as sanctioning even more extreme social control measures if the government interest is compelling. Given the dangers of cloning research to the general
welfare and the prospect of society's inability to cope with its own future,
a compelling state interest can be effectively established for research control.
Once it is established that -the state may use its police power to regulate
an activity, the question of which level of government should administer
the controls remains. The matter could be subject to the plenary power of
Congress, 122 or it may be an appropriate concern for regulation by the
police power of the states.
Since the expansive view of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce was expressed by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden,"'See notes 46-51 and accompanying text supra.
113 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
112

114 Id.
115 Id.

at 162-63.

116 321 U.S. 158 (1944). In that case, children of Jehovah's Witnesses had been
working in violation of state child labor laws.
117 Id. at 166-67.
118 See notes 133-163 and accompanying text infra.
119 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
Id. at 25.

120
121
122

274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (containing the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause).
123 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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the use of the Commerce Clause as a source of national authority has
been extended to such a degree that it may well permit federal legislation
1 4
to curtail research. In NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp.," an
economic effect having a "close and substantial relationship" to interstate commerce was held to sustain application of the National Labor
126
Since research
Relations Act 12 5 to an essentially intrastate business.
activities have not only national, but also international consequences, the
Jones and Laughlin test and the need for uniformity of research controls
should make federal action appropriate.
A similar, noncommercial treatment of the Article 1127 powers of Congress occurs in cases arising under the Civil Rights Act. 128 In order to
preclude judicial review of congressional exercise of commerce powers,
only a rational basis for finding interstate commerce and reasonable
means of implementation were required. 129 If it is assumed that anticloning legislation remained the only feasible means of preventing perfection of the procedure and that controls would be carefully limited to avoid
encroachment upon other areas of research, the reasonable and necessary
means requirement would be satisfied. In order to ensure protection for
all citizens, regulation would have to be uniformly conceived and applied.
Thus, it would appear that a strong case for federal control exists under
Congress' Article I power. 10 The fact that controls on research in the
prohibUnited States would be futile without an international agreement
131
iting such research also supports the use of federal control.
3. Academic Freedom as a Countervailing RightTo impose any straitjacket upon the intellectual leaders in our
colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation ....

Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of sus-

picion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain
free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity
and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and
32
die.
Proposals to control the direction or progress of scientific advances immediately elicit fears of governmental repression and anti-intellectual301 U.S. 1 (1937).
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
126 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
127 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
128 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
129 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
130 See also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (permitting Congress to
attack a class of activities in which some intrastate activity is involved).
131 An obstacle to effective proscription may exist in documents like the International Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 1, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948),
which provides for freedom of thought (Art. 18) and the right to "seek, receive, and
impart information" (Art. 19). This document does not have the binding effect of
conventional international law, however, and consequently may permit agreements
to the contrary.
132 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
124

125
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ism. 1 33 But prevention of the development of a process that could wreak
4
havoc on society is not to be equated with the Tennessee evolution law"
or ideologically grounded suppression. Indeed, many are confident that
genetics research will survive the adverse exposure and attacks now being
135
leveled at it.
The question remains, however, whether cloning research
must survive too.
The right asserted against governmental control of research is derived
as a corollary to the freedom to teach and learn. While there is little case
law dealing solely with freedom of research, 13 6 recognition of the vital
role of research has been expressed by many academic policymakers, in137
cluding the American Association of University Professors.
With reference to academic freedom in general, many questions remain
about the existence of any cognizable interest.
When we speak here of the scholar's rights we do not refer to
legally established guarantees for the law provides few of the
particular safeguards he needs, and in the nature of the case it
1 38
must probably remain So.
More recent discussions concur with this judgment, 1"' but it still may
be possible to generate judicial support for recognition of such a legal
right or fundamental -interest14 ° when a court is confronted with an overt
research proscription in a specified area.
The first amendment arguably shelters research from government encroachment. Justice Douglas, in Griswold v. Connecticut 141 and later,

133 See I. LERNER, HEREDITY EVOLUTION AND SOCIETY (1968), for a discussion of
Lysenkoism. Lysenko was a Russian geneticist whose theories, later found to be
erroneous, were adopted by the Soviet state. Opposing findings were considered
heretical and suppressed.
134 In Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927), a school teacher was
fined for teaching, contrary to statute, the Darwinian theory of evolution.
135 Davis, supra note 59, at 1287.
136 See notes 141-148 and accompanying text infra.
137

In its Statement of Principles, the Association stated, "The teacher is en-

titled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the
adequate performance of his other academic duties ....... 56 AM. ASS'N U. PROFESSORS BULL. 27 (1970). See also R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 487 (1956); Fuchs, Academic Freedom-Its Basic Philosophy, Function, and History, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 431
(1963).
138
139

R. MACIVER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN OUR TIME 237 (1955).
See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV.

1045 (1968).
[T]he interests of teachers and students in freedom from restraints on
classroom speech have received virtually no legal recognition ...
[Tihe courts have almost unanimously upheld the power of the educational institution or state to regulate curriculum and classroom
speech.
id. at 1052. See also Comment, Academic Freedom-Its Constitutional Context, 40
U. COLO. L. REV. 600, 605 (1968).
140 See notes 141-145 and accompanying text infra.
141 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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concurring in Eisenstadt v. Baird'4 2 and Roe v. Wade, 143 included
"freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach... indeed,
the freedom of -the entire university community" 144 in his concept of
first amendment protected speech. In terms repeated in a later opinion,
Justice Douglas opined: "The state may not, consistently with the spirit
of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. ' '145 On its face, then, there would appear to exist a legal basis
supporting the position taken by proponents of unlimited research.
In a more limited context, academic freedom was brought under the
protection of the first amendment in several cases involving loyalty oaths
required of teachers and professors. While the Supreme Court initially
upheld a state's right to control the shaping of -its students' minds, 40 the
Court later began to hold invalid, primarily on due process grounds,
many such loyalty based provisions. 147 When it was alleged that the freedom to teach or learn was at stake, the Court said it would "be on the
alert" against legislative intrusions. 148 One of the first explicit statements
149
of first amendment coverage came in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
a case in which the Court warned that the legitimate governmental interests involved had to be tailored as narrowly as possible to avoid encroaching upon academic freedom. The Court observed that academic freedom
"is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.' ' 6
A further application of due process guarantees can be found in cases
involving state attempts to limit the content of course materials. The controversial Scopes'5 case upheld curriculum control by the state as a nec-

142405

U.S. 438 (1972). Contraceptive devices were dispensed after a lecture;

Massachusetts law prohibiting their use by nonmarrieds was held to be beyond the

competency of the state.
143 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
144 381 U.S. at 482.

145 Id. at 482; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 464 (1972) (concurring opinion).
In addition to arguing that "available knowledge" has been proscribed, one can draw
an analogy between the dispensation of information and the use of contraceptives (as
in Griswold and Eisenstadt), and research to make available information on cloning
and possible research directed at discovering uses for the procedure.
146 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952). Justice Douglas registered
a strong dissent, wishing to extend freedom of thought and expression to all within
society. Id. at 508.

147 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (Court upheld conviction for
refusal to testify on Communist affiliations before a House committee.). Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (A refusal to answer questions of the Attorney
General concerning Communist affiliations was held not to constitute contempt.);

Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (An arbitrary and discriminatory exclusion

under an Oklahoma loyalty law "chilled" free spirit of teachers and was held to be
invalid.).

Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959).
385 U.S. 589 (1967). Adler was distinguished in this case, but may have been
effectively overruled.
148
149

at 603.
151 Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927).
150 Id.
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essary incident to public welfare protection. But, in Meyer v. Nebraska15 2
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,1 5 the Supreme Court, while recognizing
the existence of state interests in the regulation of curricula, limited such
regulation to purposes bearing a reasonable relation to valid state concerns. Later, the Court invalidated content proscriptions premised "upon
reasons that violate the First Amendment," in holding constitutional a
state law prohibiting the teaching of non-Biblical evolution theories in its
54
classrooms.
With regard to cloning research, it might be possible to extend the protection of the fourteenth amendment to those scientists affected by proposed controls. If the aforementioned cases can be construed to encompass research activities or if a strong link between research and teaching
or learning were established,155 a cognizable interest could be asserted
against legislation allegedly bearing no reasonable relation to the purpose
of a "moral" or "healthful" education. Once established, however, this
right may still be subject to countervailing interests sufficient to outweigh
the relative importance of academic freedom to society a large.' 5 6 For
example, in American Communications Association, CIO v. Douds,' T
the Supreme Court rejected prior mechanical tests of the limits of free
speech, 158 and adopted a balancing test.15 9 The first amendment, according to the Court, is "dependent upon the power of constitutional government to survive ...,"16 and does not "comprehend the right to speak
on any subject at any time." 1 6' The crucial factor, then, is whether the
views "clearly and imminently" threaten to yield "conduct against which
6
the public has a right to protect itself."' 2
One can extend the expression of "views" to encompass the pursuit of

152 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (A prohibition against teaching foreign languages to children under eighth grade held to be invalid).
153 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (State law requiring all children to attend public school
was held unconstitutional as unreasonable requirement to ensure good education.).
1'4 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). The law was held to be an "establishment of religion."

155 See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
156 See notes 98-107 and accompanying text supra.
157 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449 (1958).
158 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (clear and present danger test).
159 339 U.S. at 399.
When the particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order,
and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgement of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of these
two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the par-

ticular circumstances presented.
Id.

160 Id. at 394. See
where the Court, in
Amendment in some
which the guarantees

161 339 U.S. at 394.
162

Id. at 395.

also United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947),
a Hatch Act prosecution, said that the "rights of the First
instances are subject to the elemental need for order without
of civil rights to others would be a mockery. Id. at 95.
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research, and the carefully guarded rights found in Griswold may succumb, not to a probability, but to a mere possibility of scientific abuse.
We thus return to a determination of whether human cloning is an imminent danger, and if so, whether perfection of the technique poses a
16 3
serious threat to the nation.

IV.

THE DYNAMICS OF AN EFFECTIVE CHOICE

As a consequence of the foregoing analysis, it is likely that freedom of
research will be asserted as a protected activity under the first amendment
or as a fundamental right enjoying similar protection.16 4 Should this
occur, judicial scrutiny of any research control legislation will consist of
a balancing process going beyond the frequent deference to legislatures'
prior resolutions of competing interests. 165
But it will be the legislature which must initially confront the opposing
views, and weigh what are, to many, precious constitutional rights, against
the accuracy of projections of harm from positive eugenics. Incursions into
the domain of previously guarded academic rights can be readily justified
once the final weighing of interests has occurred; 16 6 retrospective rationalization of a decision is far easier than the process of arriving at the
determination in the first place.
The task of lawmakers will be to choose the less onerous alternative.
The choice is between protection of the individual rights of the researcher
and the student 167 and protection of society against the consequences of
potentially harmful scientific advances.
Whatever the final determination, it will be crucial to have ensured
that all relevant interests were represented in the decision-making pro163 The issue of the extension of fourteenth amendment rights to private institutions
under state control is not settled. The application of state action to a public restaurant, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), and to a
company town, in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), would lead one to believe
that research freedoms would without doubt exist. In this regard see Developments
in the Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 139, at 1056 (pointing to necessary
connections between state government and private schools); Developments in the Law
-Equal Protection, supra note 99, at 1183 (positing that education has become an
interest comparable to voting and criminal process).
However, no state action was found in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972) (A private club licensed by state liquor board refused to serve Negro guest.).
The status of state action remains unsettled, although it would appear that the trend
is toward not extending the concept.
164 See note 157 and accompanying text supra.
165 See notes 98-107 and accompanying text supra. Of course, if no federally protected right is found, then only a reasonable basis for the legislation is necessary to
sustain it against constitutional challenge. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 485 (1970).
16G See, e.g., Freund, supra note 24, at 19.
This is an issue that transcends scientific freedom, the freedom to
inquire and to know, since it can determine for future generations the
very capacity and the will to know, no less than the possession of other
traits of thought and feeling that we regard as the essence of the human.
Id.
167 See notes 133-155 and accompanying text supra.
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cess. Thus, a balanced and constantly functioning source of information
must be made available to the decision-makers, even after measures are
enacted. Most people outside the acadmic community do not view research freedom as important as matters which more directly affect them,
such as tax expenditure questions. 168 When mistrust of scientists is coupled with what appears to be a menacing probability, 169 objectivity at the
legislative level will be all the more important.
Also deserving careful attention is the notion expressed in the equal
protection cases 170 that all measures be tailored as narrowly as possible
in achieving the desired end. If research proscription is chosen, the specific goals must be set forth at the outset; areas closely related to eugenics
should be carefully scrutinized so as to avoid unnecessary legislative encroachments. Communication with those involved in other areas of research could be used to assist in the modification of existing policies. It is,
therefore, prerequisite to any program of control that an efficient, receptive, and broadly based policy- and decision-making body be established
on a permanent basis. Without continuous, informed reevaluation, the
result could be autocracy and legislated fear.
Divergent views will continue to exist regarding the necessity to curtail
research, but few would welcome sole scientific control of the use and
limits of cloning. 171 The mandatory control required to assure uniform
results and application is viewed by some groups as but a small extension
of already significant police power controls 172 and by others as an alarming intrusion. Most importantly, then, the law must react before it is
placed in the position of having to accept rather than to choose.
-I. Scott Bass

168 Kidd, The Implications of Research Funds for Academic Freedom, 28 LAW
CONTEMP. PROB. 613, 624 (1963).
169 Tunney & Levine, supra note 29, at 23.

If people become sufficiently frightened-if they feel the need to be
rescued from a menace they do not understand-they are more likely
to delegate freedoms and less likely to respond with reason.
Id.
170
171

See notes 100-110 and accompanying text supra.
See generally Sorenson, supra note 62.

172

See, e.g., Callahan, Ethics and PopulationLimitation, 175 Sci. 487 (1972).
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